Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

William B. Harris v. Genave H. Tanner, Grace H.
Mcphie, Bannie H. Durfee, and Grant H. Harris
and James H. Harris v. William B. Harris : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER; Attorney for Respondents;E.J Skeen; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Harris v. Harris, No. 16810 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2026

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTA..B

WILLIAM B. HARRIS >

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GENNIE H.. TANNER, GRACE. H .

McPHIR, BANNIE H. DURFEE,
and GRANT H. HARRIS ,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Resoondents,)
~
)
and
j..A.NES H . HARRIS ,

Plaintiff in Intervention-Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM B. HARRIS,

Defendant in Intervention-Appellant~

Case No. 16810

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

___

etc .

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District
in and for Tooele County
Honorable David K. Winder, District Judge
SKEEN AND SKEEN
by E. J. SKEEN
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellan1

HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER
Zy HOLLIS S . HUNT
345 South State Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

" ..::-,

il

:r::;i,...,,.,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Attornais
for Library
Defendants-Bespondents
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
AP i\ ?, J 1QQr
,~/~~*1~-:,:

~:;~~~~~\~-~t~Y~'-"').1

,,_,

~
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

..

V\...;~

I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ·UTAH

WILLIAM B. HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GENAVE H. TANNER, GRACE H.
McPHIE, BANNIE H·. DURFEE ,
and GRANT H. HARRIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents, )
and
JAMES H. HARRIS ,

Plaintiff in Intervention-Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM B. HARRIS,

Defendant in Intervention-Appellant_.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court
Case No. 16810

~~~--~~~--~~--~--~~))
)
In the Matter of the Estate
of

JAMES HENRY HARRIS , a 1 so
known as JAMES H. HARRIS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~--~--~----~-))
WILLIAM B. HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
.GRACE HARRIS Mc_PHIE, et al,

Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

----~~~~~----------~--)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District
in and for Tooele County
Honorable David K. Winder, District Judge

SKEEN AND SKEEN
by E. J. SKEEN
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER
by HOLLIS S. HUNT
345 South State Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cases Cited

ii

Statutes Cited

ii

Statement of Kind of Case .

1

Disposition in Lower Court

2

Relief Sought on Appeal

2

Preliminary Statement .

2

Statement of Facts ...

.

. . . .

3

Statement of Points . .

12

Argument.

13

Point I
. . . . .
The Court Erred in Declaring and Determining
that the Assets of the Harris-Harris Partnership, Including the Proceeds from the HarrisFidler Partnership, have been fully and completely Designated and Distributed and that
there has been a Winding up of the Affairs of
the Harris-Harris Partnership

13

Point II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Court Erred in Determining that William
.... "Shall have no further Claim Whatsoever
on the Estate of James H. Harris."

20

Conclusion.

~

........ · . · · ·

26

i
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED
Page
Andrade v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. 459, 17 Pac 532 . . 26
Auerbach's Estate, 23 Utah 535, 65 Pac. 488

26

Bankers Trust v. Riter, 56 Utah 525, 190 P. 1113

. 19

Burke Mach. Co. vs. Copenhagen, 138 Or. 314, 6P2d
886 at P. 888

18

Cobb v. Harl ens tein, 47 Utah 17 4, 152 P. 424 .

19

Ferrin vs. Ferrin, 7 Utah 2d 5, 315 P2d 978

18

Graham vs. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, .270 P. 456 . .
Graham vs. Street, 109 btah 460, 166 P 2d 524
Niels~n's

Ni~lson,

. . 18

107 Utah· 564, 155 P2d

24

Ogden p & p Co. vs. Wyatt, 59 Utah 481, 204 P. 978
at p 983, 22 A.L.R. 359

17

Rue's Estate, 11 Utah 428, 182 p 2d 111

24

968

SharE

v.

ksiate v ..

. 18

SharE, 54 Utah 262, 180 P. 580

TriEE 's Estate, 51 Utah

359~

170 P. 975

Wilson vs. Meyer, 23 Utah 529, 65 P. 488 .

. .

19
25
.18

STATUTES CITED
Section 48-1-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953

. 18

Section 48-1-35, Utah Code Annotated 1953

18

Section 75-1-304, Utah Code Annotated 1953 . . . . . . 24
Section 75-3-1001, Utah Code Annotated 1953
Section 75-11-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953

26
. 18

ii
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM B. HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

GE NAVE H. TANNER, GRACE H.
McPHIE, BANNIE H. DURFEE,
and GRANT H. HARRIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents,)
and

JAMES H. HARRIS,
Plaintiff in Intervention-Respondent,
vs.

WILLIAM B. HARRIS,
Defendant in Interverition-Appellant.
etc .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16810

APPELLANT '·-s. BRIEF

S.TATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

The above consolidated cases Nos. C-8326 and C-8984
arose out of a partnership between James H. Harris, now deceased,
and his son William B. Harris, the appellant, and involve the
identification of partnership property, accounting, and the

winding up of partnership affairs.·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DTSPOS'ITJ:.ON IN LOWER ·coURT

The trial court made and entered a judgment determining the value of certatn items of partnership property,
determined tnat William

B~

Harris must pay the estate of his

deceased partner for the property in his possession, denied
further partnership accounting, and declared that there had
been a winding up of the affairs of the partnership and the.t
William ·B. Harris had no claim against the. Estate of James H.
Harris, Deceased.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

T1ie appellant seeks a reversal of the· judgment and
a remand for the purpose of hearing evidence on remaining
i'ssues in the two adversary cases and for an order requiring
that the ·per-s0nal repres.entatives make an accounting in the
James· IL. Harris Es·tate in accordance with the probate code, so
that the El.ppellant will have an opportunity te claim ownership
of certain property listed in the

inventory~

PRELIMINARY STATEME:NT

The re.cords in the· c0nsolidated adversary cases and
in th.e prooate proceediJ'.'lg are numbered separately as are the
trans·cripts·,_

All references :in th.i.s brief will be. to page

numbers· i'n an i:"dentifi:ed record or the transcript,

I.t will be

noted that tfie pages in the records are numbered from the bottom
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of the file to the top.

Thus, the first page o.f a document

in the file bears a higher number than the last page.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
James H. Harris and his son William B. Harris, herein referred to as "James" and "William", became partners in the
operation of a livestock and farming business in the 1930's,
which partnership is herein referred to as the "Harris-Harris"
partnership.

About 1943, both James and William entered into

a partnership with Wilton Fidler and Merrill Fidler, herein

referred to as the "Harris-fidler" partnership.

The Harris-

Fidler partnership was dissolved by a court decree in 1970 when
James was nearly 90 years old.

Three of his daughters and a

son claimed that their brother, William, had no interest, as a
partner or otherwise, in land, sheep or other assets of the
business and prevented him from continuing in the livestock and
farming operations.

William filed a suit; No. C-8326, against

his sisters and brother to restrain them from interfering with
the livest0ck and farming business., for damages and for other
relief~

James intervened, claiming ownership of certain land

that appeared on the record in William•s name and certain
personal property, and that William had.defrauded him.
-

p~

(R. 8984

109)
In 1975, James died and the above entitled probc.te

proceeding was filed.

Thereafter, the second suit, No. 8984,
-3-
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was filed against the personal representatives in that capacity
and as individuals for an accounting for Harris-Harris partnership money and property and for hay and gr·ain converted and sold,
for the
relief.

~inding

up of the partnership business and for other

(R. 8984 - p. 8)

The three cases were consolidated for

trial and were tried before Hon. Bryant H. Croft, who wrote a
detailed memorandum decision, dated November 3, 1977, (R. 8984 pp. 110 - 90), which the parties stipulated would be considered
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

(R. 8326 - pp 52, 61)

A judgment dated December 14, 1977, based on such findings and
conclusions determined that James and William were partners,
that they were equal partners in the Harris-Fidler partnership,
that William, individually, owned certain land and that other
land

w~s

partnership land; and that certain designated and

described personal property, consisting of farm and livestock
equipment, was partnership property,

(R. 8326 - pp 69 - 62)

The court also determined that the. accounts for partner-::
ship income fer the years 1972, 1973 and 1974 were settled and
determined that the assets of the Harris-Harris partnership consisted of (a) certain farm and sheep equipment, listed below,
taken from the partnership income tax return:
Cost

Item

Date Acguired

Plew

1971

$2,100.00

Sprayer

1971

871. 00

Sheep Camp

1971

1,600.00

Tents

1971

522.50

-4-
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·, Tteni

Date·

Ac·~luir.ed

Cost

B~cks

1971

135.00

Di:sc

1970

1,651.00

Bucks

1970

467.00

Bucks

1969

360.00

Loader

1969

325.00

Truck.

1969

3,780.00

Drill

1969

3,000.00

Elevator

1968

258.00

Tr.uck

1968

6,000.00

Plow

1967

923~00

Ba.ler

1967

2,170.00

Tract0r

1965

5,340.00

Typewriter

1964

203.00

Ttller

1964

2,070.00

Plow

1962

481. 00

Also, all fully depreciated i.tems wh.i.ch. formerly appeared in the

partners-hip depreciatt:.on schedule;

(_b}

all Bureau of Land Manage-

. merit Grazing Permits; (c} all property which came to James and
William upon the dis·solution of the Harris .-Fidler partnership;
(d) certain cashiers checks .i and (e)_ land in Tooele County,
The Court gave a jud'gment to Wi.lliam for $5, 287. 50 for
Wtlli~am '"s

one.-half of the proceeds from the sale 0£ certain

grazing permits to one Joe Fawce.tt, and di.re.cted that the cashier's
che.cks, be cas.fied and the proceeds be equally divided.
g~apns

In para-

6. 7 ~nd 8 of th_e judgment it is provided:

-5-
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''6. All monies contained in the James H.
Harris bank accounts as testified to by Genave
H... Tanner, including those'·· funds transferred by ·
her before the death of James H. Harris, shall
be accounted for by the co-executrices in the
probate estate.
·
"7. That the claims of the Estate of James
Henry Harris, Deceased, against William B. Harris
and the claims of William B. Harris against the
Estate of .James H. Harris ·for an accounting for
income received from the farming arid sheep busines·ses conducted by the partnership through the
years 1972 to 1974, ·inclusive, are dismissed, as
the income tax returns show that the partners had
approximately equal receipts.·
'"'8. Only one-half o~ the assets that came
out of the Harris-Fidler partnership and one~half
of the assets of the James Henry Harris and
William B. Harris· parj:ne·rship, are assets of the
estate of James Henry Harris deceased, -and are
subject to probate, and none of the interest of
Wi'lli::am B. Harris in such partnership assets are
subJedt to the obligations or expenses of said
estate . "
(R . 8 3 2 6 , p . · 6 4)
All claims· and counterclaims for money damages asserted
by the parties in Cases Nos, 8326 and 8984 and for attorneys fees

and costs· were

dismissed~

No appeal was taker. from the

Ju~gment.

In July 1978, William fi.led a motion in the consolidated cases for an orde.r enfo'rcing the Judgment to req 1.iire (1)
that the Harris es·tate pay to William $5, 287. 50 as ordered by
tne ·court; (2} that the estate pay to William one-half of .all
money· received from the Harri:s-Fidler partnership upon its dissolution; (3) that the ·personal representatives of the estate
make an accounti~g for all Harris·,..Harris partnership property in \
their possession; (.4). that such personal representatives make an

--6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accounting in writing for all Harris-Harris partn.ership
property sold by James H. Harris and by his estate .. with the
sales price set opposite each item;
represent~tives

(5) that the personal

to disclose to the court, in writing, the

amcunts of Harris Estate funds disbursed, with or without a
court order, since the trial; (6) that the personal representatives dis·close to 'the Court ir..

wr:L.ti~g

the amounts on deposit

in certain bank accounts; and (7) that.the personal representatives disclos·e to the coulit the amounts of money withdrawn from
the bank accounts.

(8984 - pp. 118 to 116 ~)

On August 9, 1978,

_William fi:led a written report of i.tems of personal property in
his possession, with the appraised value of each item.

(8984 -

PP. 121 - 120.)
In September 1978 > the. pers·onal representatives filed
a document entitled "Motion to Compel Disclosure and Objections
to Items· of Personal Property in Possession 0£ William B. Harris''
in which it is stated that Wi:.lliam had omitted from his list of
pers·onal property certain items sold or used for trade-in purposes; that an o'!"der should be made compelling William to produce his. books and records regarding utiliza ti~on of such partnership property since 1973; that the. personal representatives
object to the appra:t:sed valuation of the. items in William's. list;
~nd

that Wt1li:am should be required to account in writing for

all p!:operty sold or otherw:t.se dispose.d of prior and subsequent
to the death of James.

(8984 - pp. 124 ~ 122).

-7-.
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On September 26, 1978, the personal representatives
filed oojections. to William's motion discussed.above, denying
(1) that they were obligated to pay to William $5,287.50 as
ordered by Judge Croft; (2) that they were obligated to pay
one-half of the money received upon dissolution of HarrisFidler; ·and (3) that William has no right to the disclosure
of James H. . Harris Estate money matters because he was disinh.erf ted and had :wfthdraw-n his. objections to the probate of the

wilL

(8984

~

pp . 129 - 126.)

The personal representatives also filed, (a) e list
of items 0£ personal preperty in the possession of the estate,
and (b) a list of items of partnership property sold or otherwise dtsposed of, prior and subsequent to the death of James,
consi·sting of two i.tems·:

(l) a new Sheep Camp, appraised value

$2,200.00, and (2) "Miscellaneous horses and sheep sold through
Lyman Warr, as. temporary
-- '·'See Court file·*''.

admint~

(8984 -

tra tor. as per court approved"

pp~

132

~

130.)

Wtth. reference to the second item above, it should
be n<Dted that in the "'Order Authortzing Administrator to Sell
livestock and to deliver horse to Vendee upon collection of
Sums Due", dated September 8, 1975, it is stated:
''-It is further ordered that any claim of
William B. Harris to the livestock which is to
be sold at auction shall attach to the proceeds
of such sale for ultimate resolution in connection with litigation pending, and that the administrator shall pass title to said livestock to the
purchaser free and clear of any and all claims of
any nature whatsoever." (Est. File No. 1 - 30 - 29)
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The estate file contai.ns. a petiti:on by the special
administrator for approyal of first and final account which
lists under the heading, qReceipts.'·', livestock and other
partners·hip items, and also hay which William produced and
owned, as follows:
"RECEIPTS
"Pine Canyon Dairy, sale of hay
$ 414.00
The Proud Porker Ranch, sale of hay
250.00
The Rocking R Rodeo Co., sale· of hay
1,130.00
Grant Thunderson, sale of hay
15.00
The Proud Porker Ranch, sale of hay
533.75
Gordon Manzione, sale of hay ·
14.50
Evelyn Johnson, sale of hay
30.00
Gary Ahlstrom, sale of hay
50.00
U. S. Treasurer, tax rebate
200.00
Cook Sheep Company, sale of sheep camp
2,200.00
Proud Porker Ranch, sale of hay
100 . 00
State Insurance Fund, return of deposit
48.52
Eddie Roberts, sale of sheep
550.00
Foster Nix, sale of bucks
240.00
Producers Livestock, sale of bucks
55.53
Rick Martinez, boarding horse
75.00
Commodity Credit, wool settlement
266.40
Lloyd Cox, sale of horse
150.00
William B. Harris, sale of horses
310.00
Production Credit Assn., shares sale
265.00
Commodity Credit Corp., wool incentive payment2,206.89
Total Receipts:
$9,104.59"
(Probate - p. 139)
The motions were set for hearing before the Honorable
David K. Winder.

At the hearing, after a discussion by the

Court and counsel, the Court said:
"Well, let's take, for example, this first
item, assets of the Harris-Fidler partnership.
I think that we have got to determine what the
assets of that pa~tnership were that were dis·tributed to James H. Harris ·and Willi2m B. Harris
by the Order. I don't think that Judge Croft -that there is anything in his decision that adjudicated that. He said, tone thing is clear
and that whatever assets came to the Harris's
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were owne4 equally by James and Wil~;_iam -~nd
neither could deprive the other of the latter's
interest merely by taking over the assets .. "
(Tr. 6-19-79 - p. 8)
Counsel for the respondent argued that Judge Croft's
judgment was res- judicata as to the assets that· cam·e fr~m the
Harris-Fidler partnership and that the matter of determining
who got what was improper.

(Tr. 6-19-79 - pp. 9 - 13).

We

quote from that transcript, p. 14:
"The Court: I don't relish trying to do it
again; but your motion is denied. We ai;-e going
to go into it. L-et 's put -in the evidence and move
this case at hand."
Mr. Wilton Fidler and William B. Harris testified
at some length about the money and items of personal property
which went to the Harris' upon the diss6lution of the partnership.

(Tr. 6-19-79 - pp. 14 - 46 and 46 - 60).

Mrs. McPhie

testified about partnership trucks and farm equipment and then
was asked whether she had a list of the assets of the estate
and about what money was in the bank.

She was then asked about

bank accounts existing at the time of her father's death.

She

said she did not have the bank statements or cancelled checks
on hand, but would produce them at 2:00 p.m.

(Tr. 6-19-79 -

p. 87.)
-~

-

When court reconvened at 2: 00 p_.m., and the witness
was asked if she had the cancelled checks, Judge Winder stated
that during the noon hour he had been reviewing Judge Croft's
memorandum decision and had decided that the only partnership
property still involved in the case were the items listed on
-10-
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the depreciation schedules appearing in the Croft Judgment
and fully depreciated items formerly listed.

He said the

$5,287.50 paid to William for the Joe Fawcett BLM permits
squared the account

thro~gh

1974 and that the monies in the

bank account were, according to Judge Croft's memorandum,to be accounted for in the probate estate.

The Court held

that all items listed in the judgment had been adjudicated
to be partnership property and that we are not concerned with
any other proper:ty ·except that which had been depreciated
out.

(Tr. 6-19-79 - pp. 116 - 120)
The tri.al court, by the reversal of his original

ruling, limited the trial to the items of personal property
(farm machinery and trucks listed in the Croft Judgment and
depreciated items) and made and

~ntered

a judgment dated

November 8, 1979, declaring that the property listed in para.
la is in the possession of William and is personal property
of the Harris-Harris partnership, with the values having been
determined by the court, and the property listed in lb. is in
the possession of the James H. Harris Estate.

The judgment

then recites that William shall have the right to retain possession of all personal property itemized in l(a) and the estate
shall have the right to retain possession and ownership of all
property itemized in paragraph l(b).

In paragraph 6 of the

judgment, William B. Harris is ordered to pay the estate

$8,243.50.

(R. 8326 - pp. 105, 104).
-11-
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The judgment then declares, in paragraph 7, that
the Harris-Ha=ris partnership is
" .... hereby terminated, wound up and the assets
consisting of real and personal property are hereby
fully and completely designated and distributed to
the partners, their heirs and assigns. This termination and distribution of all partnership property
both real and personal is inclusive of all the
proceeds of the Harris-Fidler Partnership terminated
in 1970, which proceeds are included in the distribution of the partner~hip property of James H. Harris
and William B. Harris." (R. 8326 - p .. 103)
We also quote paragraph 8:
"8. William B. Harris, as a partner and on
behalf of his partnership interest in the HarrisFidler Partnership and in the James H. Harris and
William B. Harris partnership •. shall have no
further claim whatsoever·- on the Estate of James H.
Harris; his partnership interests being fully
adjudicated and determined in this Court proceeding and the prior proceeding before Judge Bryant
H. Croft, on July 6) 1977, whose decision was
filed on or about November 3, 1977." (R. 8326 p. 103)

This appeal is taken from the November 8, 1979,
judgment.

-STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The Court erred in declaring and determining

that the assets of the Harris-Harris partnership, including
the proceeds from the Harris-Fidler partnership, have been
fully and completely designated and distributed and that
there has been a winding up of the affairs of the HarrisHarris partnership.
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2.

The Court erred in determining that William --

" .... shall have no further claim whatsoever
on the Estate of James H. H·arris."

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING AND DETERMINING
THAT THE ASSETS OF THE HARRIS-HAR~IS PARTNERSHIP,
INCLUDING THE PROCEEDS FROM THE HARR,:;t:S-F.IDL~R PARTNERSHIP,
HAVE BEEN FULLY AND COMPLETELY DESIGNATED AND DISTRIBUTED
AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A WINDING UP OF THE AFFAIRS
OF THE HARRIS-HARRIS PARTNERSHIP
- After hearing arguments on the motions of the
appellant and respondents to enforce, supplement and carry
out the judgment by Judge Croft in the consolidated cases
Nos. C 8326 and C 8984, the trial court first decided to take
testimony as to the assets of the Harris-Fidler partnership
and then changed its mind and stated that the only items of
partnershi.p property still invo 1ved in the case were the i terns
listed in Judge Croft's memorandum decision and judgment taken
from the depieciation sch~dules and fully depreciated {terns
formerly appearing in such schedule.

(Tr. 6-19-97 - pp. 116

120). ·The remainder of the hearing was devoted to these items.
We believe that the case was only partly tried because the trial court ignored many items which were admitted
by the respondent to be partnership property and were considered
by Judge Croft in his memorandum decision and Judgment to be
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partnership property.

These are:

1. "Miscellaneous horses and sheep so~d- through
Lyman Warr, as temporary administrator, as per court
approved." (R. 8984 - pp 132 - 130)

2. "All property which came t_o Jam~s and William
from Harris-Fidler, upon its dissolution, including
money, sheep, other persona_l property, and the
proceeds from the sale _p'f partnership property, not
included in the individual income ta~ returns of the
partners for the years 1972, 1973, and 1974." (8326
- p. 67A)

3 .. Money ip the bank accoun~s of James H.
-Harris, unidentified and unaccounted for by the
Personal Representatives··.
·
With respect to Item 1, above, it was admitted that
miscellaneous horses and sheep were partnership property, and
an inspection of the list of items included in the special
administrator's first and final account that, in addition to
sheep and horses amounting to $1,305.53 that the following other
items were also partnership property:
"State Insurance fund return of deposit

$

48.52

Connnodity Credit, wool settlement

266.40

Production Credit Assn., shares sale

265.00

Commodity Credit Corp. - wool incentive pmt
Total

2,206.89
$2, 786. 81"

(Probate - p. 139)
The hay items covering hay which the undisputed
testimony shows belonged to William personally amounted to
$ 2 , 3 56 . 7 5 . (Tr . 7 - 6- 7 7 ~ pp . 41 - 4 3 . )
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For some reason, unknown to the writer, the trial
judge made the estate give credit for the sale of the sheep
camp to Cook Sheep Company, $2,200.00, but ignored.all of the
remaining items in the list.

These items could·not have been

covered in the 1972, 1973, and 1974 tax returns, because the
sales took place after James' death.Item 2, the Harris-Fidler assets, was specifically
covered in the Memorandum Decision and Judge Croft's judgment
and adjuged to be partnership property, but the trial judge
changed his mind after hearing some testimony and he indicated
that he would hear no further testimony, . exc_~pt pertaining to
farm machinery and equipment.

(Tr. 6-19-79 - pp. 116 - 122).

A discussion of Item 3, relating to money in the
James H. Harris bank accounts before and after his death, requires a consideration of the testimony of Genave H. Tanner.
She testified at the trial before Judge Croft that she handled
James' bank accounts before and after his death; that account
0 3340031 at Zions First National B-ank had in it ab.out $26, 000. 00
at the time of her father's death.

She was asked whether at

the time of the trial the account was still in the bank in the
same names.

She answered:

"It was until two montqs ago. I took.the·
balance left.and put it in my own name, which
was legal by law, I am sure." (Tanner Tr., pp.
11, 12)
Mrs. Tanner further testified that there was an account
in the Commercial Security Bank in James' name and her name with
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a balance of $11,691.62.
still in

existe~ce.

She was asked if that account was

She said,

"No, Sir. The day dad passed away he told us
to get to the bank. I withdrew $11,000.00. That
we put in First Security under Genevieve H. Tanner,_
Ellen H. Smith." (Tanner Tr. - 14)
Mrs. Tanner was asked about money in other accounts
that came from her father.

She said,

"Yes, Sir, in Tracy COllins."

(Tanner Tr.,

p. 15)

She said there was $12,000.00 at the time the account
was opened in 1968; that $3-,700.o·o had been drawn out to put
in James' checking account.
The check from Fidlers, Ex. P-53, was deposi-ted in
James' account.
In view of the testimony referred to above, Judge
Croft's memorandum decision and the Judgment require the making
of an accounting.

He directed such an accounting.

graph 6 of the Croft Judgment - page

See para-

6, this brief.

(R.

8326 - p. 64)
It is apparent that in the review of the memorandum
decision and Judgment by Judge Winder, that there was a faHu.re
to distinguish between capital assets of the partnerships and
income.

Judge Croft ·carefully distinguished between them when

he stated unequivocally that the partners were each entitled
to one-half of the assets.

He said,

"One thing is clear and that is whatever
assets came to the Harris's were owned equally
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by James and William and neither could deprive
the other of the latter's interest merely by
taking over the assets." (R. 8984 - p. 106)
Judge Croft determined the issue as to accounting
for income by comparing the amounts each partner received dur-

ing the years 1972, 1973 and 1974.
(R.

8326 - 68 - 66.)

tax returns.

The Judgment reflects this.

The information he used came from income

Capital assets were not identified.

When Judge Winder decided that all issues as to
accounting were settled, he relied on the income set.tlement
for the three years and on the fact that James' Estate had paid
to William one-half of the amount, ($5,287.50) received by James
for the BLM permits sold to Joe Fawcett.
"So in other words, it _seems to me that all
we are talking about, really, is what is listed on
the Depreciation Schedules plus personal property
fully depreci_ated prior thereto. And he specifically
said that th~ $5,287.50 settled it, squared the
account through 1974." (Tr.- 6-19-79 - p. 117)
The money,

testifie~

to above, the sheep, other BLM

permits, the wool incentive of $2,206.89, the horses, and the
equipment (except for that listed in the Winder judgment) were
completely ignored.
The winding of the Harris-Harris partnership affairs
has been irregular and contrary to law from the beginning.

It

is settled law that once a partnership is shown to exist, there
is a presumption that it continues and the burden of proof is
on him who asserts its termination.

Ogden P & P Co. vs. Wyatt,

59 Utah 481, 204 P. 978 at P. 983, 22 A.L.R. 359.

See also
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Burke Ma.ch·. Co.· vs. Copenhagen, 138 Or. 314·~ 6P2d 886 at
p. 888.
In the case of Fe~rin vs. Ferrin, 7 tiiah 2d 5, 31~
-P2d 978, one partner e~pelled the other.from the b~siness and
took over complete control.

The Court held. that thfs did not

terminate the partnership.
The case of Grahaci vs. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 P
2d 524, holds that where one partner sold the partnership
property, it did nbt te~min~te the partnership, b~t equi~y
will trea·t the partnership as existing and require an acco~nt
ing for the profits.

See also Graham vs. Street, 2 Utah 2d

144, 270 P. 456.
The attention of the Court is called to the statutory
provisions relating to the right to wind up the partnership ·and
the rights of the parties respecting the application of partnership property.

See Sections 48-l-34;and 48-1-35, UCA 1953.

Section 75-11-9 provides that when a partnership
exists between the decedent at the time of his death and any
other person, the surviv.ing partner is entitled to the posses~ion
of the partnership property and shall wind up its affairs.

It

has been held that this section is declaratory of the common
law.
Wilson vs. Meyer, 23 Utah 529, 65 P. 488.
The Utah Supreme Court has decided that where there
was an existing partnership under such circumstance the executors have no right to wind up its affairs.
-18-
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Cribb v. ~~rl~nit~in, 47 Utah 174, 152 P. 424.
B. ankers ·Trust v. Riter, 56 Utah 525·, 190 P. °1113.
Sh~rp

v. Sharp, 54 Utah 262, 180 P. 580.

Under the plain language of the statute and the cases
· cited ab.ove, William was entitled to possession of the partnership property and the proceeds from the sale of the partnership
property and to wind up the partnership affairs.

The proceeds

from the sale of the sh~ep and from the sale of the partnership
property by the ·special administrator itemized
(p. 9) and'

as

fn

this brief

set forth in the probate file should be ordered

divided between the

~state

of James H. Harris and the plaintiff,

and all other partnership money s~ould be so divided.
In this case there is no evidence whatever that the
partnership affairs were wound up prior to the death of James
H. Harris.

In fact, by settling the accounts for 1972 - 1974,

Judge Croft treated it as a partnership through 1974.

The

burden of proof of termination has not been sustained by the
respondents and under the statutory provisions quoted above,
the winding up of the affairs of the partnership should have
been ordered by the Court and the necessary testimony should
have been taken for an accounting.

The burden of going ahead

with the accounting was on the personal representatives who
had possession of everything except the farm machinery.

They

have made no accounting·, and the court required none.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT WILLIAM
".~ .. SHALL HAVE NO FURTHER CLAIM WHATSOEVER
ON THE ESTATE OF JAME·s H. HARRIS."
As stated in the first sentence of the memorandum
decision, cases Nos. 8326 and 8984 were consolidated and came
on for trial on July 6, 197 ,
11

cases.

together with consideratiqn __of Probate
3552, the issues concerning. whi~Q.._w_ere
endin trial of the two consolidated
emphasis a de
R.
- p. 109

••••

Neither the memorandum decision, which by stiputation constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
nor the judgment include findings, conclusions or determinations of ·any"issues in the probate proceeding.

As indicated

above, Judge Croft specifically states that such issues were
deferred pending the trial of the consolidated adversary cases.
However, the memorandum decision indicates on page 11 (R. 8984,
100) that,
"All moneys contained in James bank accounts as testified to by Genave, including
those funds tra~sferred by her before James'
death are to be accounted for by the co-executrices in the probate estate."
On pages 19 and 20 of the decision, Judge Croft again
discussed the probate proceeding:
" .... To this petition William appeared
specifically to challenge the jurisdiction of
the court to make such determinations concerning
William. I think the challenge to this court's
jurisdiction on the mere filing of the petition,
without any service of process on William, in the
probate case is properly taken and I so rule.
William as an heir or devisee, if any he be, is
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not a party to the probate proceedings.so as t~
have his interest in the.matters related in the
petition subject to a determination by the court.
Such claims against William were no where asserted
in the pleadings in ~ither case No. 8326 or No.
8984." . (R. 8984 - pp 92 - 91)
..
The first sentence in the Judgment like in the
memorandum decision refers to Civil Nos. 8326 and 8984-, followed by the words
.
'' .... together with consideration of the
probate case No. 3552."
The only other references to the probate proceeding
are in paragraph 6 of the judgment and paragraph 8.

The word-

ing of paragraph 6 is practically identical with the quotation
from page 11 of the memorandum decision and paragraph 8 states
that only one-half of the assets that came out of the HarrisFidler partnership and one-half of the assets of the HarrisHarris partnership are assets of the estate
Harris and are subject to probate.

of

James Henry

(R. 8326 - p. 64.)

It is apparent from the foregoing

(1) that the

probate proceeding was not and has not been consolidated for
trial; (2) that Judge Croft deferred action ~n the probate
matter until the determination of the two consolidated cases;
(3) that the court had no jurisdiction of William for the
purpose of determining the issues set out in the executrices'
petition as discussed on page 19 of the memorandum decision,
quoted above; (4) that since the decision and judgment and no
other action has been taken to give the court jurisdiction of
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the person of William; (5)

William's property rights in the

partnership money; the Harris-Fidler assets, and the sheep and
horses cannot be disposed of in the consolidated cases as,
quoting Judge Croft,
"Such.claims against William were no where
asserted in the pleadings in either Case No. 8326
or No. 8984." (R. 8984 - p. 91)
(6)

The probate matter must be permitted to proceed in accord-

ance with the statutes; (7)
probate; and, (8)

an accounting must be file'ci in the

William's right to object and to challenge

efforts to distribute to the heirs his sheep, horses, hay and
money cannot be denied, except by a court with jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of 'his person.
Referring to (5) above, it should be noted that the
personal representatives admitted that miscellaneous horses
and sheep sold by special administrator Lyman Warr were partnership property.

Also, the judge in the probate proceeding when

authorizing the sale of livestock recognized that the livestock
were claimed by William and directed that his claim would attach
to the proceeds of the sale. (See page 8 of this brief.)
There was before the court the testimony of William
(See page 14 this brief.)

as to the ownership and sale of hay.
\

Mrs. McPhie testified about the hay at the June 19, 1979 hearing (Tr. 6-19-79, pp 88 - 9Q)

All of these matters were brought

to Judge Winder's attention at the October 29, 1979, hearing
and he made the following comments:
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"THE COURT: Well; -I _think Findings of Fact and
Conclusions_ of 4aw have_ got to be drafted._ And what
I intende<;l to do, and this is. _su~h a complex matter
and I know nobody is satisfied but we can't litigate
it time after time after time, and _I've gone back
and read Judge. Croft's decision again today, or
partially read it, and I had read it about three or
four times, and I reiterated-again and again at the
June 19th-20th hearing that I thought there were
just a few issues that had been_left by Judge Croft.
It was my idea that they were dealt with on June 19th
and 20th, and th_e only sense in which I think the
probate matt;er remains ope~ i~_ simply that--that I
wasn't dealing with the probate matter in the sense
of decreeing the distribution but I certainly--it
was not my int~ntion that you comeback now in the
probate matter. And if it hasn't bee_n decided and
relitig?ted in the probate matter, what I dec1ded at
the 19th and 2Qth trial, because that was the oppo~
tunity to try all of these issues about the partnership and whether h~y or what or ~quipment or anything
else belonged. And as Judge Croft noted when he
decided this and as was so ~pparent to me, to go back
and try and reconstruct things in this complicated
situation after years have gone by and memories have
faded and records are gone, it is virtually an impossibility. And I'll be the first to ac~nowledge that
maybe what I did at the end of_ the June 19-20 hearing
may seem a little arbitrary b~t I thi~k there's such
a great advantage to laying this matter to rest, and
I tried to do it as fairly as I could. And it's
obvious that William Harris and hi$ daughter and his
wife and Mr. Skeen don't agree but the remedies are
going to have to be by appeal because what I think,
you $aid i~ fairly well in the Order that you just
referred to. And other than the obvious error in
Paragraph 2--or what is it?"

The court had read Judge Croft's memorandum decision
many times and must have been aware of the lack of jurisdiction
over William in the probate matter (which was not consolidated
for trial) as is so clearly pointed out by Judge Croft.

It is

certain that he had made up his mind that only the farm machinery
and livestock equipment matters were left unresolved and that his
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decision could, as a matter of law, end the litigation.
The probate proceeding was not affected by the judgment fro~ which this appeal was ta~en.

The motions under con-

sideration by Judge Winder related only to the issues in the
adversary cases which were tried and adjudicated by Judge Croft.
There was no pending petition and response in the
probate or other pleadings which presented issues for judicial
determination.

If, in the probate proceedings, a pe.tition

or other pleading had been filed to try the issues as to the
ownership of the items sold by the special administrator and
proper notice

had~

been given to the interested parties, it is

clear that the probate court would have had authority to try
the issues.
In re Rue's Estate, 11 Utah 428, 182 P2d 111
.

·-

.•

Nielsen's Estate v. Nielson, 107 Utah 564, 155 P2d
968.
But in the instant case the court had before it
motions to carry out and enforce the judgment in the consolidated adversary cases.

It went beyond all issues and decided

that in the probate proceeding, William had no claims against
the estate.
Section 75-1~304 provides that unless specifically
provided to the

con~rary

in the code or unless inconsistent

wi-th its provisions, the rules of civil procedure shall govern
formal probate proceedings.

There were, of course, no plead-
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ings or other proceedings to form issues for trial.
The- personal representatives filed a petition several
years ago in the probate proceeding for interpretation of the
will, instructions. as to ademption, for an accounting by
William and for the determination of William's interest in the
property inventoried.

(Probate 157-153) William made a special

appearance by motion attacking the jurisdiction.

This was

heard by Judge Croft and he disposed of it as follows:
" ..... To this petttion Wil_liam app~c;i.red
specifically to challenge the jurisdiction -0f the
court to make such determinations concerning William.
I think the challenge to this court's jurisdiction
on the mere filing of the petition, without any
service of process on William, in the probate case
is properly taken and I so rule. William as an
heir or devisee, if any he be, is not a party to the
probate proceedings so as to have his interest in
the matters related to the petition subject to a
determination by the court. Such claims against
William were no where asserted in the pleadings in
either case No. 8326 or No. 8984." (R. 8984 - pp.
92' 91)
This ruling ended the efforts of the personal representative to pursue the matter and no other petition was filed
to raise the issues as to the ownershir of inventoried property
and no process was served on William.
We quote from In re Tripp's Estate, 51 Utah 359, 170

P. 975:
"The district court, sitting as a court of
probate in the first instance, has no jurisdiction
to settle the accounts between the surviving partner
and the renresentatives of the deceased partner, but
is limited.to the power of requiring the- surviving
partner to properly account. This being done, the
limit of its powers sitting as a court of equity is
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is reached until proper proceedings are instituted
In re
Auerbach's Estate, 23 Utah 535, 65 Pac. 488. As
is said in Andrade v. Supeiior-Court, 75 Cal. 459,
17 Pac. 532, citea in respondent's brief:
to ·invoke the equity powers of the court.

'The court cannot settle and .a~just
the account. If unsatisfactory, this can
only be done by a court of equity. '"
Judge Croft pointed out the proper method of raising
the issues in the probate proceeding, but the personal representatives refused to follow it.

·s~ction

the procedure for closing estates.

75-3-1001 sets out

This was igno.red.

The trial court erred in failing and refusing to require the personal representatives to file an accounting and
erred in making and entering a judgment, holding that William
had
" .... no further claim whatsoever on the
Estate."
This judgment denied William's right to his day in court to
determine the issues of ownership of hay, sheep, wool, horses
and the wool incentive, all of a value in excess of $6,900.00.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in failing and refusing to
require an accounting for sheep, horses, money and other items
of partnership property which were in the control of James and
his personal representatives.

The elementary law that the

partner in possession must account was completely ignored.

The

trial court misconstrued Judge Croft's memorandum decision and

-26Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

judgment in holding that the only assets remaining for distribution to the partners were the i terns of farm machinery l:is ted
in the memorandum decision and depr.eciated items formerly listed
in the income tax returns.
The court proceeded to adjudicate William's partnership interests in the proceeds from the sale of partnership
property

describ~d

proceedings.

under the heading "Receipts" in the probate

This was error for the reasons, (1) the probate

court had no personal jurisdiction over William, (2) the probate
proceedings had been deferred until the consolidated adversary
cases had been tried and was not before the court at all, and
(3) there were no issues framed in the probate proceedings by
any pleadings.
The judgment should be reversed and the cases remanded
for further proceedings consistent with the law.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN AND SKEEN

E":"J°.

E

Attorney 6r Plaintiff-Appellant
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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